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Abstract: This paper attempts to explain the trajectory and unusual outcome of
this courtroom encounter by applying Erving Goffman’s approach to interac-
tion. It employs his notions of frame and footing, plus those of face, ritual
deference and demeanour when they are useful. This perspective shows that,
as well as the socially constituted power asymmetry, the participants create an
interactive asymmetry in which the accused, Penelope Soto, although a canoni-
cally ratified participant, is sometimes effectively ‘de-ratified’. However, as the
encounter progresses, Soto and the judge shift their footings back and forth
such that into the court-hearing frame, another frame, that of the social en-
counter, is insinuated. This clash of frames is shown to be a major cause of the
trajectory taken by the encounter. The Goffmanian perspective also points up
the effect of the use of a video link for this encounter. This application of
Goffman’s framework functions as a test of some of his concepts and the paper
concludes with some comments and suggested elaborations.
Keywords: Goffman, frame, footing, participation framework, face, demeanour,
ritual deference
1 Introduction: the problems
Along with most others in this volume, the main impetus for this paper is the
desire to understand how a routine procedure in a mundane legal case ended
so unexpectedly and seriously; the outcome was not only highly undesirable
for Soto (the defendant) but also (at the least) problematic for the legal authori-
ties. How did it come about? A step-by-step description of effects and the trig-
gers for them can be rendered thus:
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The judge sentenced Soto to 30 days in jail
because she said “fuck you” at him and gave him the finger
because he doubled her bail from $5,000 dollars to $10,000 dollars
because she said “adios” to him
because he said and waved “bye-bye” to her
because .....................................................................?
There is a question to be answered at the end of this backwards chain because
it is clear (see section 2 and end of section 5 below) that “bye-bye” with a
farewell gesture is not the usual way this judge concludes his dealings with
inmates in court hearings. To attempt to find out why he did this, therefore,
we need to go further back and explore the interaction up to this point. In
doing so, we can also approach more nuanced understandings of the other
links in the chain. The box above presents only a mechanistic, surface set of
explanations. In fact, not one of those actions is determined by the preceding
one. Even the final outcome, though perhaps not surprising, appears to be
problematic (see the discussion in the court after Soto has finally departed).
Going back one link, it is not at all self-evident that the judge doubling the bail
should lead to Soto’s outburst – she could have guessed that dire consequences
would follow. It is equally puzzling as to why the judge reacted to that one
single word from Soto by doubling the bail he had just set. The only obvious
provocation is its unorthodoxy in a context where one would expect the subor-
dinate person to choose ‘safe’ forms. So this action needs explaining too.
The directional thrust of this article, then, is to approach a plausible set of
explanations for the trajectory taken by the meeting between the judge and
Soto. This aim is pursued chiefly through the lens of Erving Goffman’s work.
In the process of this exercise, therefore, a test is conducted of the applicability
of some aspects of his architecture of interaction and some elaborations can be
suggested.
2 Before the beginning
Before the judge starts dealing with Soto, we see her standing some 5 metres
directly behind another inmate, in the apparently designated ‘up-next’ position
(the white rectangle on the floor of the jailhouse – see video), waiting for this
other inmate’s dealings with the judge to conclude. The judge announces the
bail amount, issues a verbal order to the inmate to ‘stay away from’ a certain
person and then puts aside a document he has been working with, all without
once directing his gaze to the inmate. The inmate appears momentarily be-
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mused but then realizes that her case is concluded and that she can/should
now leave the position designated for dealings with the judge. Accordingly, she
turns to her right and shuffles silently off camera.
At this point, Soto steps forward towards the position just vacated but then,
after turning her gaze briefly and slightly to the left, halts before she gets there,
presumably on the instruction of an authority figure in the jailhouse. She then
waits in this in-between position for a full 15 seconds while the judge completes
the paperwork from the previous case. Only when the judge calls out her name
does she step fully forward into the designated position.
3 Goffman’s conceptual apparatus
A Goffmanian approach starts from his very simple but inclusive understanding
of interaction as conscious co-presence. That is, whenever two or more people
are within sight and/or sound of each other, and know that they are, there
is interaction. The subset of these circumstances more commonly meant by
‘interaction’ is what Goffman calls focused interaction, which occurs when peo-
ple extend to each other the status of co-participants and “jointly ratify one
another as authorized co-sustainers of a single... focus of visual and cognitive
attention” (Goffman 1964: 135). Each identifiable spate of focused interaction
with some sort of recognizable beginning and end is called an encounter.1
The above-described hiatus in the initiation of the Soto-judge encounter
illustrates unfocused interaction. Soto is aware of the judge’s presence and that
of others, and also aware that those others are aware of her presence. This
mutual awareness has effects on her behaviour. A significant feature of all
interaction is that this awareness of others’ awareness of us puts constraints
on what we do (Goffman 1963b: 24–88). Only when the judge calls out her
name, which appears to be the standard means by which these encounters are
opened (see end of video), does he recognize Soto as a co-participant.
The hiatus serves to illustrate two further aspects of the Goffmanian per-
spective. One is that interaction, being mere co-presence, does not itself entail
talk. This means that if we are to understand a spate of interaction fully, we
need to examine not only what is said but also what else is done. Thus, al-
though we may speak of utterances, turns at talk, phrases, clauses or the like,
the basic unit of analysis is the move (Goffman 1981: 23–29), the former being
merely examples or constituents of the latter.
1 For a global summary account of Goffman’s working framework for the study of interaction,
see O’Driscoll (2009: 85–89). For a reasonably concise account of the aspects of this approach
summarized in this paragraph, see Goffman (1967: 137–148).
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The other point comes from the observation that this silence at the encoun-
ter’s ‘false-start’ is just one example of several hiatuses in talk which take place
during it. This encounter, therefore, cannot be described as a conversation.
Talk is necessary for it but not for its own sake. Rather, we are dealing here
with what Goffman (1981: 143) calls “a state of inquiry”. This means that
in order to enquire into the meaning and effect of any move, we must in the
first instance consider its relation to the assumed purpose of the encounter
(Goffman 1964; 1981: 141–143).
The matter of purpose brings us to the concepts of frame (Goffman 1974)
and footing (Goffman 1981). The former term has been used for a wide variety
of cognitive constructs (see Tannen 1993 for a review) which overlap with the
notions of ‘schema’ and ‘script’, probably the most well-known of which is
Schank and Abelson’s (1977) restaurant script. But for Goffman, focusing pri-
marily on interaction rather than mental constructs, it involves “principles of
organization which govern events … and our subjective involvement in them”
(Goffman 1974: 10). As such, it covers most of the same ground as Levinson’s
(1979) notion of activity type and is one way of addressing the question: what
sort of thing is going on here? Goffman himself also explores this matter else-
where as “definition of the situation” (Goffman 1959) and “social occasion”
(Goffman 1963b). Whichever term is used, this concept concerns expectations
about the setting for activity, its goals, the focus of attention and topic(s) of any
talk and, crucially, participants’ behaviour. For investigating this last aspect,
Levinson starts with socially constituted expectations and thus emphasizes a
range of “allowable contributions” (Levinson 1979: 368). Goffman, on the other
hand, starts from the subjective nature of expectations and thus focuses on the
roles of individual participants and how they present themselves – and how
these roles and self-presentations are negotiated. Indeed, he offers examples
(Goffman 1963b: 20) of interactants having different assumptions about what
exactly is going on and therefore what sort of behaviour is appropriate. This
potential for divergent assumptions of frame turns out to be relevant in the
Soto case (see below).
The more subjective focus leads to his allied notion of footing, which af-
fords a close-up view of the dynamics of interaction as it takes place. Indeed,
Goffman defines the notion only in dynamic terms: “A change in footing implies
a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and others present as ex-
pressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance.”
(Goffman 1981: 128) This focus on change implies something to change from,
some aspects of which are brought along to an encounter before it begins, a
fact apparently recognized by Goffman when offering examples of changes in
footing which involve “an alteration in the social capacities in which the per-
sons present claim to be active” (1981: 126). Thus this concept, while focusing
Brought to you by | University of Huddersfield
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/8/18 4:49 PM
DE GRUYTER MOUTON A Goffmanian perspective on the Soto case 43
attention on the moment-by-moment manoeuvrings of interaction, takes ac-
count of situationally and socially ordained roles. Scholars have long recog-
nized these two aspects of role and the need to distinguish them in terms of
scale (e.g., Irvine 1996): the one intra-situational, referring to the relation be-
tween a participant and an utterance; the other extra-situationally assigned
(initially at least) referring to the relation between a participant and the en-
counter. Some (e.g., Thomas 1986; Sarangi and Slembrouck 1996; Halvorsen
and Sarangi 2015) have conceptualized them as a distinction between ‘dis-
course roles’ and ‘activity (or ‘social’) roles’ respectively. They have also recog-
nized that the one can affect the other, so that the roles which participants
actually play during interaction are subject to change as a result of what they
and other participants do and so “a change in our footing is another way of
talking about a change in our frame for events” (Goffman 1981: 128 – see also
Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 5 on the dynamic reshaping of context). For the
purposes of this paper, we may say that footing describes a participant’s inter-
personal and social stance at a particular moment in an encounter, while frame
involves a prototype of all participants’ stances for an encounter as a whole.
Crucially for this analysis, it has been convincingly shown (e.g., Sarangi and
Slembrouck 1996: 66–71) that these footings are interpreted and assessed in the
light of this prototype.
The analysis in this paper also makes use of the concepts of face, demean-
our and ritual deference and. The first of these is defined (Goffman 1967: 5) as
the situationally contingent, other-bestowed image of self. In the context of this
paper, it can be thought of as the self-image which a participant finds them-
selves projecting as a result of their understanding of other participants’ under-
standings of their footing.2 Demeanour is that aspect of self-presentation “typi-
cally conveyed through deportment, dress and bearing, which serves to express
to those in [a person’s] immediate presence that he is a person of certain desir-
able or undesirable qualities” (Goffman 1967: 77).
The phrase ‘ritual deference’ is a conflation of Goffman’s definition of ritual
as “a perfunctory, conventionalized act through which an individual portrays
his respect and regard for some object of ultimate value to that object of ulti-
mate value” (1971: 88) and his use of deference as “that component of activity
which functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly
conveyed to a recipient of this recipient” (1967: 56 – original italics). As can
be seen, these two describe more-or-less the same kind of behaviour and
Goffman’s ensuing elaboration in both cases emphasizes its quotidian and
ubiquitous occurrence in human interaction. Indeed, by virtue of such occur-
2 For an overview of the vast amount of scholarship on face which has taken place since
Goffman first introduced this concept in 1955, see O’Driscoll (2017).
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rence, and by virtue of its ‘perfunctory’ and/or ‘symbolic’ enactment, ritual
deference goes mostly unnoticed by those giving and receiving it, being merely
one aspect of what Watts (1989, 1992, 2003) and many scholars since have
termed politic behaviour. As such, in most kinds of encounter, the ‘unmarked’
kind where no special instrumental urgency, interpersonal antagonism or pow-
er asymmetry is in play, it is part of our frame for behaviour. Its frequent ab-
sence in the encounter examined here is indicative of a ‘marked’ encounter.
4 The frame for this encounter
The ‘prequel’ to this encounter (see section 2) is one enactment of the stark
power asymmetry which obtains in this kind of encounter. Not only has its
general scheduling been arranged by the authorities; the judge’s behaviour
demonstrates that he has the right to decide the precise moment at which it
actually commences. It is also the judge who decides when it finishes and, of
course, it is he and the other legal professionals taking part in the encounter
who direct the topic(s) of talk. In addition to these canonical aspects of the
encounter as an event, there are several physical realities which impact on the
demeanour of the two main interactants and contribute to the power asymmetry.
Clothing: The judge is wearing the robes of judicial authority, while Soto
is clad in the signature garb of the incarcerated. Note also that under his robes
the judge is wearing clothes of his own choosing, while Soto appears to have
been stripped of these means for self-presentation.
Posture: Throughout the encounter, the judge is sitting, Soto is standing.
With the exception of occasions when standing indexes greater freedom of
movement than that of the sitter, it is invariably the case that the sitting party
is the one with greater power in an encounter. Notice that in western culture
at least, a directive to sit down is typically read as an invitation, while one to
stand up is typically considered an instruction.
Props: As well as the swivel chair in which he sits, the judge has many
props for his body or parts of it. He sits behind a large desk on which he can
rest his arms. In his hand is a pen which he can wield to make marks on the
documents which lie on the desk and with which he can legitimately busy
himself. Soto, on the other hand, has nothing with which her body can take
shelter from exposure. She appears to stand in an empty space.3 And, as she
3 In fact, at the onset of the next encounter, the inmate appears to rest her arms on some
sort of surface just visible at the bottom of the screen, but Soto never avails herself of this
potential prop.
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holds nothing about her person and her coveralls have no pockets, she has no
opportunity for ‘side-involvements’ (Goffman 1963b: 43–63). Her only available
prop is her hair, which she makes extensive use of during the encounter.4 This
circumstance – being rooted to the spot without props – is an unusual one for
an interactant to find themselves in. That it is one which is discomfortingly
unfamiliar to Soto is witnessed by the many postural adjustments which she
makes during the encounter, including one when she appears to stagger slight-
ly. And owing to the lack of props, these adjustments are foregrounded in the
eyes of observers. They become so salient that they can be received as possible
evidence of incapacity, as when the judge enquires whether she is under the
influence of drugs.5
Orientation: To look directly at the judge and the other participants at the
other end of the video link, Soto has to look straight ahead. But the judge, in
order to look directly at Soto, has to turn his neck, trunk or swivel chair to his
right side. This asymmetry is significant because changes in orientation have
been shown to signal adjustments in frame (Kendon 1990) and in this case gaze
is a contributory factor in the participation statuses of the two (see next section).
5 Participation framework: the de-ratification of
Soto
To circumscribe that aspect of participants’ footings which is to do with their
purely operational role in an encounter, Goffman (1981: 129–143) offers what
he calls participation framework. This distinguishes firstly between those who
are ratified participants and those who are merely bystanders. These latter have
no rights or obligations to take an active part in the encounter but they are
aware that it is taking place and often can be sufficiently within eyeshot and/
or earshot to catch details of what the ratified participants are doing, such as
what they are saying, in which case they become overhearers. They are impor-
tant because ratified participants tend to take account of their presence (see
Goffman 1981: 85–98), a crucial example of which can be witnessed at the end
of the encounter examined here (see section 7.4 below).
4 Thanks to Tilly Flint and Helen Attwood for drawing my attention to hair as prop.
5 This condition, whereby a person’s immediate circumstances cause them to behave in a
conventionally unorthodox manner which is then read as evidence of their unfitness for life
in society at large, is one which Goffman draws attention to in his analysis of mental patients
(Goffman 1961; see also Goffman 1963a; 1967: 67).
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Among ratified participants, Goffman distinguishes not only between
speaker and hearer but also deconstructs the latter into addressed and unad-
dressed. That is, there may be a person (or people) present who the speaker is
not addressing but who nevertheless is (are) fully ratified in the sense that they
are accorded the right to hear completely what is said and often the right to
self-select for the next turn. The extent to which they have this latter right
depends largely on the frame. Many encounters are more structured and pur-
poseful than prototypical casual conversation and in these cases the right is
often restricted and distributed unequally. The encounter examined here is an
example.
As can be inferred, Goffman presents any itemizing of participants in this
way as ‘cross-sectional’; that is, a way to capture a frozen moment in time. Of
course, in most kinds of encounter, speakers and hearers often swap roles as
it progresses, and ratified participants who are unaddressed at one moment
may be addressed at the next or themselves become the speaker. If we combine
these dynamic considerations with the concept of frame, it seems clear that
certain kinds of encounter dictate, or at least predispose towards, certain pat-
terns of participation framework throughout their course, including particular
roles, rights and obligations allocated to particular participants (hence the no-
tion of activity role – see section 3 above). In a pub conversation, for example,
one would expect frequent and rapid alternations of occupation of the speaker,
addressed and unaddressed slots, with no discernible order or specialist alloca-
tions. In a job interview, on the other hand, one would expect less frequent
changes and a recognizable, probably pre-arranged, order of allocations among
members of the panel (and also, possibly, an ‘observer’ to see fair play – that
is, a fully ratified participant who is confined to the unaddressed role through-
out). With these considerations in mind, it should be possible to identify a
characteristic participation-framework pattern for most kinds of encounter.
In the case of these pre-trial courtroom hearings, we may say that the ca-
nonical pattern is as follows:
Ratified participants 1 >>> 2 >>> 1 >>> 2 >>> >>>
Speaker judge inmate judge inmate
Others addressed inmate judge inmate judge
unaddressed legal staff legal staff legal staff legal staff
That is, we can assume that the encounter will take the shape of a series of
interchanges between the inmate (here, Soto) and the judge. And as Soto can
speak only when spoken to, the ‘ideal’ participation-framework pattern for the
whole encounter except its closing is a series of adjacency pairs (Schegloff
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1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1973), with the judge speaking (the first pair-part)
and Soto responding relevantly (second pair-part). In addition, there are legal
professionals in the courtroom who have a right – and probably a duty – to
hear what is said.
However, ideal patterns tend to bend to situational exigencies. To circum-
scribe the interaction realities of this encounter, therefore, we need to identify
a default pattern. In this case it is clear that those legal professionals have an
occasional active role to play. This encounter includes several interchanges
between them and the judge. In this light, we might appeal to Goffman’s notion
of ‘subordinate communication’ (Goffman 1981: 133–134). In some encounters
there are moments of additional activity beyond the main focus of attention
which, though they might (as here) involve a subset of ratified participants, do
not divert or interfere with the ‘dominating communication’. From this view-
point, we could posit the following participation-framework pattern:
Dominating communication Subordinate communication
Ratified participants >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>
Speaker judge Soto judge judge judge staff judge staff
Others addressed Soto judge Soto judge staff judge staff judge
unaddressed staff staff staff staff Soto Soto Soto Soto
However, the footings adopted by the legal staff in this encounter extend
well beyond assisting the judge when he asks them to. It also includes the
ability to bring up new details unbidden, to interrupt the canonical dominating
communication with Soto and even to self-select to take the next turn in the
dominating communication – the question “Miss Soto, are you working?” is
unprompted by the judge or by former turns. Given these observations, it is
intuitively unsatisfactory to confine the contributions of the legal staff to the
subordinate category. Instead, we can see that over the encounter as a whole,
each one of the three classes of ratified participant here (the judge, Soto, the
professionals) takes at least one turn at occupying each one of the three ratified
slots (speaker, addressed, unaddressed), giving us a pattern as follows:
Ratified participants >>> >><<6 >>>
Speaker judge Soto judge staff staff Soto
Others addressed Soto judge staff judge Soto staff
unaddressed staff staff Soto Soto judge judge
6 In this case the arrows point both ways because either party can initiate the exchange.
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But this pattern is also an unsatisfactory representation. It presents an im-
pression of three equal parties, which would be very misleading because, un-
like the other two parties, Soto has no right to self-select for the next turn.
Moreover, an investigation of details of the interaction reveals a multi-faceted
attenuation of the canonical framework.
First, we have seen (section 2) that before the judge calls out her name,
Soto is held in a limbo between the status of bystander and that of ratified
participant. After calling her forward, the judge then accords some recognition
of her ratified participation status by formally greeting her (“Good morning,
Miss Soto”). However, the greeting is hurried and perfunctory, with ‘good’ re-
duced to an unreleased velar stricture and by the time he has completed it, his
gaze, after a brief glance in her direction, has returned to his paperwork. This
glance, then, appears chiefly to assure himself that she is present rather to
accord her any ritual deference. He then holds his gaze on the paperwork
throughout his enunciation of what “you’re being charged with ...”. His subse-
quent admission of ignorance and query about the charge, in that he is still
looking into his paperwork and the volume of his voice has reduced, is not
addressed to Soto and it is answered promptly and solely by others in the
courtroom. The judge is still not looking at Soto when explicitly addressing her
with “you’re eligible for ...”.
The apparently marginal nature of Soto’s participation status indicated by
these features is intensified in several ways. Structurally, there is her physical
dislocation from other ratified participants, whereby she becomes a viewer of
their interaction (one with not a very good view either – see section 8). Then
there is the judge’s physical orientation: the fact that he has to look to the side
to face her implies a relatively ancillary interactional role for her. There are
linguistic marginalizations too. There are third-person references by other par-
ticipants to “they” (an ill-defined group but understood to include Soto) and
to “she” (specifically denoting Soto) and there are also the specialist terms used
by the judge and staff. While it is conceivable that Soto can follow ‘pre-trial
service’, ‘priors’ and ‘count’, it is highly unlikely she can understand, as they
are uttered, ‘PTS’, ‘ROR’ and ‘division 51’,7 suggesting that Soto not only has
no self-selecting speaking rights, but sometimes limited hearing rights too.
All these features serve to perform a kind of de-ratification on Soto, effec-
tively reducing her to a bystander of her own encounter. One way of dealing
with such role indeterminacy is to identify additional roles which can be fitted
7 A layperson such as myself, for example, did not understand the first time around. I was
able to guess PTS was short for ‘pre-trial service’ after some repeated listenings, but I had to
google the other two.
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in to Goffman’s framework. This is what Levinson (1988) does. For instance,
when one canonically ratified participant is talked about as if not there, he
proposes a distinction between two types of unaddressed participant, which he
names audience and (indirect) target. This distinction works well in his exam-
ple case, where the talked-about person is being criticized. However, it does
not work so well for Soto, the salient aspect of whose marginalization is not
that she is being ‘got at’ but rather is being distanced, even removed, from
active participation. Moreover, as Irvine (1996) has argued, the number of such
extra participant roles would be potentially infinite. Rather than search for a
label for Soto’s exact participation status at particular moments, this paper
retains a Goffmanian approach to analytical categories as mere ‘scaffolding’
(1959: 246; 1967: 47); that is, as temporary structures used to construct an un-
derstanding of the data under examination. There is no obvious need to prolif-
erate typological categories. Instead, we can work with the few we have and
focus on how people (attempt to) manipulate their own footings and those of
others by what they say and how they say it. Soto at these points is back in a
limbo between ratified and unratified statuses. She has the obligations of the
former status but hardly any of its rights.
The starkest indication of Soto’s marginal participation status occurs at the
first attempted ‘closing’ of the encounter. For a period of 40 seconds after the
judge has last addressed her, she waits while judge and legal staff converse
and the judge records on paper the decisions he announces. It finishes with
9 seconds of silence as the judge completes his paperwork. He then turns to
the VL (video link) and sees with apparent mild surprise that Soto is still there
at the other end of it. Soto is supposed to have gleaned that their encounter is
terminated. There are plenty of cues for this intended closure: the parallelism
in “count 1 will be ... count 2 will be ... and refer to division 51”, the slightly
raised volume of voice, the writing-down of the pronouncements. The other
ratified participants, accustomed to these procedures, take these cues as consti-
tuting closure in themselves. But Soto, without their experience, does not.
Soto is what Goffman has called a ‘profane’ person, one to whom normally
expected ritual deference is not accorded. The evidence of the closing and
opening of the preceding and following encounters respectively suggests that
such profanization and de-ratification are default. However, the trajectory of
this particular encounter effects a gradual subversion of this default. See next
section.
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6 The dance of footings: indices of a different
frame
At the start of proceedings, Soto goes along with the profane status accorded
her. She responds to the judge’s calling out her name with a bare “yes”, show-
ing that she interprets it not as a greeting but as a summons and check on her
identity. And when a court lawyer begins questioning her, she at first likewise
falls into line. Her first three responses conform perfectly to Gricean maxims
(Grice 1975): a bare ‘yes’ to two yes/no questions and the provision of an ap-
proximate quantity after a ‘how-much-approximately’ question.8
It is in response to the next question that she begins to shift her footing
slightly (shown here in musical-score format:9)
Lawyer what do you own? OK- erp go ahead
Defendant aha I own a lot of jewellery, alright as well as- a car
She still gives a straight answer to the question posed here but her claim of “a
lot” is unsatisfactorily vague for the court. This vagueness is accompanied by
a small spate of laughter and the addition of ‘alright’, all evoking a more con-
versational style. The lawyer’s “OK” in response may be the start of an attempt
to halt this perceived drift to the conversational, but at the same time Soto
commences to itemize other possessions, assuring him she is conforming to the
instrumental frame, hence his subsequent “go-ahead”.
At this point, however, the judge intervenes – and an intricate dance of
footings commences.10
8 We may recognize this behaviour as the enactment of a profane status if we consider that
these minimal responses would be unacceptable – and assessed as ‘uncommunicative’,
‘unhelpful’, even ‘rude’ - in any activity type other than one such as this, whose social consti-
tution is such that not even the barest nod to the interpersonal is expected.
9 This musical-score transcription format is taken from the HIAT notation system (see Ehlich
1993) and has been used by several scholars of spoken interaction (e.g., Watts 2003, Bousfield
2008, O’Driscoll 2013). By representing time as spatial left-to-right movement across the page,
it can indicate time-relationships between one person’s contributions and another’s fairly accu-
rately without recourse to the proliferation of symbols found in other transcription systems.
10 This time the musical-score transcript has the innovation that each ‘instrument’ (i.e., par-
ticipant) is given two ‘staves’ in each line, one for doings which can be heard (with transcribed
words in bold typeface) and one below it for those which can be seen. Dots indicate continued
activity. For the sake of ease of reading, conventional orthography and the same font have
been used throughout, with the result that timing indicated by the left-to-right movement
across the page is not a perfect representation. In line with the transcript used in the rest of
the papers, Soto is ‘D’, the judge is ‘J.’
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1 J: well how, h-how mu-ha-how much would you say you’re jewellery’s worth?
Expressive use of hands
D: laughs
Holding arms together under chin.................................................................................
2 J: its not a joke you know we are not in a- not in a club now Eh
smiling ........................................................ Smile broadens
D: Laughter...... OK but it’s you know
arms together under chin stroking hair with both hands
3 J: well you see we are not in a club be serious about it oh you’re being very-
turns towards Soto and expressive, wide hand gesture, smile continues
D: kind of you know- I’m serious about it but it you
Stroking hair and smiling..............................................................................................
4 J: I can see you’re serious alright it’s alright how
turns back to desk, smile disappears Looks ahead turns towards Soto
D: just made me laugh you just made me laugh I apologize
Smiling, stroking, one hand on chest..... Hand away from hair, held out (still smiling)
His interruption of her itemizing (stave 1), while relevant in its propositional
content to the instrumental frame, is expressed in a conversational manner,
spoken fast with several false starts, accompanied by expressive hand gestures
and including “would you say”. These features involve a clear move away from
the impersonal, interrogation style to which Soto has so far been subjected. She
is now being asked to perform an act of personal assessment, being personally
engaged with. Thus a different, social-encounter frame which so far has only
been hinted at by Soto is to some degree accommodated and she is being recog-
nized for the first time as a full person rather than, as heretofore, an object-to-
be-dealt-with.
Soto then effects further reframing in that direction by laughing (stave 1–2),
which in a social-encounter frame can be interpreted as a metapragmatic com-
ment on a ‘too-personal’ question. The judge’s rebuff (stave 2) is a reminder of
the court-hearing frame (presumably ‘it’ in ‘it’s not a joke’ refers to the situa-
tion). However, his smile and the levity of his following comment about a club,
preceded by “you know”, indexes sociability and thus contributes to the social-
encounter thread. He could have reminded her simply that this is not a social
situation. But the club allusion brings up other connotations and associates
Soto with these, thus commenting on her as an individual.
Soto indicates assent to the judge’s observation but then attempts to verbal-
ly justify her metapragmatic stance (staves 2–3). This attempt is cut off by the
judge, who repeats his club observation and enjoins her to “be serious”. At the
same time, however, he goes along with this change in tenor towards the socia-
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ble, smiling broadly, orienting himself towards Soto, gesturing with hands and
adding a conversational “you see”. In addition, this interruption is not an ex-
plicit warning to Soto to make her contribution relevant (that is, not a response
to the start of a perceived invalid contribution), and thereby indexes a looser
frame than that of the expected orderly sequence of question and answer in
the ideal court frame. In this context, his reference to a club serves as a patroni-
zing, amused kind of admonition and despite his exhortation for her to be
serious, the effect is almost playful.
Soto’s response (end of stave 3), instead of agreeing to abide by the judge’s
directive, takes issue with the implicature contained in it (that she is not being
serious) and refutes it. Notice, then, that by this point the topic of talk is fully
Soto’s footing, not the value of her jewellery. She also (staves 3–4) attempts for
a second time to explain her laughter as involuntary but again she does not
succeed because again the judge interrupts, this time with an oblique comment
on her claim to seriousness. In that this comment cuts off Soto’s attempt to
explain herself and is accompanied by a re-orientation to his desk and the
disappearance of his smile, it brings us back to the impersonal court-hearing
frame. But at the same time its off-the-cuff nature, its conclusion with the em-
phasizing “alright”, plus the simple fact that its propositional content contin-
ues with the topic of her as a person rather than the matter institutionally at
hand, continues to index a social-encounter frame. That this frame has by now
been to some extent validated is shown by the fact that Soto feels able to repeat
her explanation (mid stave 4) after it was not heard by the judge the first two
times, serving both to re-affirm the social-encounter frame by referring to per-
sonal affect and also to follow this repositioning of herself as amusingly and
childishly inappropriate by engaging in personal, face-salient dialogue. How-
ever, perhaps aware of the judge’s possible irritation, she immediately proceeds
to utter an apology, which the judge accepts and then utters a bald repetition
of the question about jewellery.
Thus by this stage in the proceedings, both Soto and the judge, through a
series of ‘contextualization cues’ (Gumperz 1982), have been shifting back and
forth between two mutually exclusive styles of talk, the interrogatory and the
conversational, and two opposed tenors of talk, the serious and the playful.
Thereby, they have been intermingling two mutually exclusive frames, the court
hearing and the social encounter. They have co-constructed this ambiguity,
whereby a social situation has been indexed enough for Soto’s footing to have
shifted from a mere object-to-be-dealt-with to that of a recalcitrant junior, and
that of the judge from a representative of the majesty of the law to that of an
admonishing but forbearing senior. A relationship has been introduced, one
which evokes uncle and niece or perhaps headmaster and amusingly naughty
pupil.
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The subsequent exchanges similarly hint at a frame other than that of the
court hearing. A precise value for Soto’s jewellery is never established because
she offers only an approximation (“a lot of money”) and a comparison (“rick
ross”) and the judge’s indication of not understanding this allusion to a famous
rapper is an informal “huh?”. When Soto struggles to find another way of indi-
cating how much her jewellery is worth, the judge again switches the topic back
to that of Soto’s demeanour by asking her whether she is under the influence
of drugs. The addition of “actually” to her negative answer allows a number of
inferences. One is that she has interpreted the question as a matter of casual
interest. Another is that, like the earlier laughter, it is a metapragmatic com-
ment on the fact that the question has been asked at all (an inference supported
by the exaggerated physical movements which immediately precede her re-
sponse). Both these again index the social encounter frame. Yet another pos-
sible inference is that she is implying she is in the habit of taking drugs (just
not – as it happens – in the last 24 hours). Whichever of these inferences has
been drawn by the judge, the fact that he queries her use of this word further
indexes a social frame and pushes the encounter further away from its desig-
nated purpose. He is not enquiring into the relevant facts but querying what
she means.
As we have seen, the default footing for Soto for this frame is as a relatively
profane person, one with no voluntary speaking rights who is only half ‘there’,
with no face. However, the trajectory since the judge first took over the ques-
tioning of her has hinted at installing her as a full person. She never escapes
from the restricted speaking rights but she has to some extent become a ‘char-
acter’, more than just a case-to-be-dealt-with. Their footings have shifted.
7 The consequences of the dance
Having traced this drift in footings and the insinuation of a different frame, I
can now offer plausible accounts of the links in the chain of consequences.
7.1 Judge: saying “bye-bye” with farewell hand gesture
When the judge, having as far as he is concerned already terminated the en-
counter (see end section 5), notices Soto is still there, there is a need, unusual
from his viewpoint, for some explicit dismissal to be issued. Considering the
default non-person status of inmates in such encounters (as evidenced by the
snippets of two other encounters on the video), a likely course of action would
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be to instruct the jailhouse staff to remove her. But all of the indexing of the
social that has taken place induces him to dismiss her himself. A range of
means are open to him. One might imagine various indirect directives such as
“that will be all” or “you may leave”, or even “thank you” or “goodbye”. But
the judge selects none of these options. Instead he opts for a phrase-and-ges-
ture which in the context of a courtroom hearing is distinctly marked. We can
of course never know with certainty why he made this choice. But we can note
that it is perfectly consonant with the paternalistic footing which the trajectory
of the encounter has insinuated for him and the child footing which it has
insinuated for her.
7.2 Soto: saying “adios”
Along the same trajectory, and encouraged by the judge’s markedly phatic
phrase of farewell, which makes her ‘new’ child footing overt, Soto utters a
phrase of farewell perfectly consonant with it. She received an informal fare-
well, so she gives a ‘cutesy’ farewell back, the kind she might easily give to
older relatives.
7.3 Judge: doubling the bail amount
Right up to this point, however irritated he might have been by her behaviour
during the encounter, the judge is prepared to see matters as settled and the
encounter finished. This single, innocuous word causes him to get her back in
front of the VL, double her bail and then utter another farewell which appears
to be sarcastic. Why?
One reason is that she said anything at all when taking her leave. The
previous inmate did not. His farewell phrase and gesture was presumably an
ironic means of dismissal. By giving farewell back, Soto has called his bluff.
Moreover, she has thereby positioned herself as a full person entitled to ritual
deference, contra the default footings for these encounters.
Nevertheless, while we may not discount the strength of authority’s desire
to have the last word, that ‘adios’ was surely just a peccadillo. There must be
additional motivations for him to act. These presumably involve the precise
form of her farewell, which clearly has an impact on the judge because he
indexes it in his 2nd dismissal of her. One obvious feature is that it projects
entirely new footings for both the judge and Soto as fellow Latinos (for a discus-
sion of this aspect, see Christie, this volume). Given that none of the other
ratified participants have Latino voices, a special affinity with each other is
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thereby projected. This positive facework could be experienced by the judge as
severely threatening to his negative face (see O’Driscoll 2007). Here, however,
I want to suggest a threat to another aspect of his face.
Notwithstanding frame expectations, it is not always the judge who has
effective topic and frame control. It is Soto who, by laughing at the question
put to her about the value of her jewellery, most forcefully indexes the social
encounter frame which has up to that point only been hinted at. In response,
the judge does not reassert the court hearing frame but rather introduces the
topic of her demeanour. In particular, it is more obviously Soto, through the
performative nature of her apology for laughing (“I apologise”), who drags the
encounter back to the default frame – but only after insisting on getting her
previously ignored self-justifying personal point across. She retains the social
encounter frame at this point; then she flicks the court-hearing-frame switch.
Notice also that the judge never succeeds in establishing the monetary value
of her jewellery despite repeated attempts. When she struggles in her attempt
to give such a value, the judge gets sidetracked onto her demeanour again,
first by his drugs query, then by her ‘actually’. Then the lawyer interrupts and
he gives up this line of enquiry.
Given then, that he is only very imperfectly performing the control vested
in him, his face may be vulnerable. In this light, the gasp of amusement from
a female member of the legal staff, clearly audible on the recording, which
immediately follows Soto’s ‘adios’ is crucial. It is perhaps this move which turns
a vulnerable face into a threatened one; not only does he consider he has been
‘cheeked’ – now he is seen to have been cheeked. So he cannot just let it pass.
It is perfectly possible that there is also a more impersonal rationale for the
judge’s behaviour at this point. This analysis has examined the behaviour of
both Soto and the judge during the encounter. But it is the prerogative of the
powerful to examine only the behaviour of the less powerful. Notwithstanding
his part in encouraging it, the judge may have assessed Soto’s behaviour and
demeanour throughout as inappropriate, that her apparent enjoyment (all that
laughter and smiling) demonstrates a lack of contrition, that her apparent abil-
ity to insert herself as a person into proceedings demonstrates a lack of proper
humility. She just wasn’t chastened enough. From this viewpoint, it is not the
judge’s face that is at stake but the dignity of the law. And from this viewpoint,
that insolent ‘adios’ was just the straw that broke the camel’s back.
However, some sort of appeal to face must be made in order to account for
the manner in which he doubles the bail. He calls her back with a smile, but
this disappears when she arrives in view and does not reappear as he gets the
necessary document back from the legal staff, announces that bail will be
$10,000 and amends the document accordingly. No hint of explanation is prof-
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fered and there is only the briefest of glances in her direction. It is an overt
demonstration of absolute, almost whimsical, power which puts Soto firmly
back in her non-person place.
7.4 Soto: ‘fuck you’ with finger gesture
Soto has to this point shown no interest whatsoever in the amount of bail to
be set. If $5,000 was no problem, why does $10,000 appear to be such a very
big deal, big enough to provoke a move which a second’s consideration would
have told her will be disastrous for her? The answer must be that this move is
not a reaction to instrumental considerations. Very obviously, she is not acting
rationally, but in the moment.
Along this line of thinking, there are two possibilities, not entirely mutually
exclusive. The first concerns the social aspects of footing. The indices of a social
encounter during the interaction have encouraged her to feel she is a ‘full’
person who has established some sort of relationship with the judge and this
is why, it has been suggested, she felt it OK to utter (or at least to get away
with uttering) a cutesy farewell to the judge. His extreme reaction now makes
her feel tricked. She may even feel hurt by his sarcastic ‘adios’ – note that she
displays a shocked face not only at the announcement of the new bail amount
but also again at this utterance. And if her ‘adios’ did indeed include an appeal
to shared ethnicity, its sarcastic return (with a markedly different pronuncia-
tion) has thrown this appeal back in her face.
I am suggesting, then, an affective provocation. But assuming she is a per-
son of minimal self-control, this alone cannot satisfactorily explain her reac-
tion. So there is another possible explanation which involves us returning to
participation framework and considering the possibility of bystanders to this
encounter. If there are bystanders at Soto’s end of the VL, we may guess that
she has a peculiarly strong awareness of them – she is in their immediate
presence, and they in hers, while she is in only the mediated presence of even
her fellow ratified participants (and they in hers). We know for sure there is
one inmate in this role (standing in the up-next position) and we can presume
there is at least one jailhouse official there too (the one who appears to halt
Soto at the start of the encounter). Is there anyone else?
After the judge has called her back, and she stands again in the encounter
position waiting for him to speak, she twice turns laughingly to her right, the
direction from which she returned. When the judge announces $10,000, there
is an aspect of melodrama in her shocked face, whose sincerity is somewhat
belied by a continued smile. During this period, lots of background comment
and laughter can be heard on the recording, which seems to be coming from the
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jailhouse end of the VL. The conclusion to be drawn from these observations
is that there are several inmate overhearers who can see her movements and
hear her words clearly. It is not fanciful to suppose that her subsequent out-
burst is very much for their benefit – more precisely, for the benefit of her face
with them. In support of this supposition, notice that her action takes place
right at the edge of the screen, after she has vacated the encounter-position. In
view of the fact that at the commencement of the encounter she was not treated
as a ratified participant until she was called fully forward into this position,
she may consider herself to have been removed from the encounter once she
has vacated it. In other words, it is quite possible she is not aware that her
outburst is visible and audible to the judge, that for her what is going on at this
point is unfocused interaction, with her taking account of the fellow inmates
in whose presence she resides, unaware that she also resides in the presence
of a very different group of people at the other end of the VL.
7.5 Judge: sentencing Soto to 30 days in jail
We have now travelled right back up the chain of causality. This final act is
relatively self-evident. Soto’s bald, taboo malediction, reinforced with the taboo
gesture, constitutes a severe attack on the judge’s face and is interpreted by
him as an attack on the dignity of the court. Whether there is sufficient legal
warrant for his decision is not, being legal, a matter for this article.
8 A conclusion of sorts
This article has shown that the application of Goffmanian concepts to the
analysis of a piece of interaction affords genuine insights into participants’
behaviour. It can, moreover, even offer plausible explanations for this behav-
iour with relatively little recourse to speculations about mental and emotional
states. This is possible because, while Goffman places the individual at the
centre of attention, his concepts are designed to illuminate situational realities.
His individual is the interacting, performed individual, who is being witnessed
and can witness s/he is being witnessed, not a manifestation of any putative
psychological state. Any approach to understanding the feelings or thoughts of
the inner person comes from this external direction, from what is visible and/
or audible. His notions of face and footing, for example, both describe the
individual, and both hint at an internal aspect (of affect and/or cognition), but
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both are determined at any one time by what can be witnessed. The next four
paragraphs offer some thoughts on particular concepts.
1. The analysis here, like that of Grainger (this volume), exemplifies how
concerns for face can protrude into encounters in which personal relationships
are not canonically relevant. These concerns (contra the conceptualization of
face in Brown and Levinson 1987) seem to operate alongside, and to some
degree independently of, rational ones (see O’Driscoll 2017: 107–111 for a further
example). Indeed, the final spate of interaction in the Soto-judge encounter
sees them operate in apparent opposition to these. When Soto is called back
again, her demeanour in front of the VL is very different from what it has been.
From a rational viewpoint, one might expect an abject apology along with the
explanation that her outburst was not intended to be accessible to the court.
But instead, she adopts an overtly confrontational stance, squares up to the
judge with a serious facial expression and folded arms, issues the challenging
“What’s up?” and then, when questioned by the judge whether he really heard
“fuck you”, freely admits to her delict and adds a comment (“I’m not going to
deny it”) which implies she has no intention of ‘taking it back’ – or even apolo-
gizing for it. She does this because she now has a face to maintain with her
fellow inmates (see 7.4 above) which has become more important to her than
any substantive outcome.
2. In this article, I have attempted a development of the notion of participa-
tion framework. In that it pertains to a frozen moment, this notion is a compo-
nent of footing. But I have proposed we also think in terms of participation
framework patterns for whole encounters, a notion that relates to that of frame.
After all, one crucial aspect of expectations about participants’ behaviour (itself
a crucial aspect of frame) is who among them is to do the talking, who they
talk directly to, whether and to what extent others get a chance to speak and
so on. In the analysis above, I implied a distinction between canonical partici-
pation framework patterns (what one expects in the abstract given a certain
broad category of activity type), default patterns (what one gets given local
contingencies) and actual patterns (what can be observed of a particular en-
counter). These distinctions seemed useful in the Soto case. Whether they can
prove more widely useful remains to be seen. Participation framework patterns,
with consideration of these different degrees of specificity, offer one way of
exploring how footings at the momentary (utterance or move) level, and foot-
ings at the encounter (frame or activity type) level, impact on each other. They
could perhaps be used alongside the notion of discourse types (acts or sequen-
ces of acts which can be related to the activity type) as outlined by Sarangi
(2000) and utilized by, for example, Halvorsen and Sarangi (2015).
3. As we have seen, the marginalization of Soto during this encounter sug-
gests an apparent boundary problem for the categories of participation frame-
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work. There is one other feature of the interaction here which does likewise
and in addition raises a problem for the notion of encounter as a single, bound-
ed event. Consider the jailhouse staff. In the normal run, they do not seem to
be ratified as participants in judge-inmate encounters. But at one point, the
judge addresses them directly (“bring her back”). They appear then to be never-
theless ‘on call’ for inclusion in the ratified circle. Note also that they have a
role to play in ensuring a smooth transition from one such encounter to the
next, so that they are, we must say, ratified with regard to the series of encoun-
ters. Phenomena of this kind do not seriously call into question the two notions
(and Goffman himself seems to revel in examples of their fuzziness), but they
serve as a caveat to their over-reification. Indeed, as has been implied in the
analysis here, Goffman’s categories are better seen not as pigeon-holes into
which participant roles must always be stuffed, but rather as reference points
for the precise mapping of roles at precise junctures.
4. The utility of the category of a move (as an act realized through speech
or something else or both together) has not been demonstrated. Having intro-
duced it, this article has not used it much. The problem is that different signifi-
cant behavioural features can take place all at once but span different lengths
of time. To make the concept systematically operational, therefore, one would
have to atomize it and allow each description of a move to refer to only one
of propositional content of speech, paralinguistic speech features, gaze, facial
expression, bodily orientation or gesture. This would be unsatisfactory because
“visible human conduct is integral with the use of linguistic forms. There is
only one system of embodied communicative behavior, not a system of visible
conduct distinct from a system of linguistic behavior” (Arundale 2013: 13).
Nevertheless, the value of taking all the above features into potential account
and, in a Goffmanian spirit, of not assuming pre-eminence for the first of them
is, on the evidence of the analysis here, transparent.
Finally, a comment on the use of a video link for this kind of event: As
Licoppe and Veyrier (2017: 161) observe, this practice “raises new issues regard-
ing visibility and participatory statuses in the courtroom”. The emphasis in this
work and others on this topic (e.g., Licoppe 2015) is on the effect of ‘camera
actions’ on the possible interpretation of what participants say and do. Here,
such an effect does not apply, as the split screen shots are static throughout.
However, it has been suggested that the video link arrangement in this case
was a factor in participants’ behaviour itself, the most glaring example being
Soto’s performance of angry defiance at the end of the encounter, her bystand-
ers occupying a larger part of her consciousness than her fellow ratified partici-
pants. That this is so follows from Goffman’s understanding of interaction itself,
which involves all those co-present mutually monitoring each other. In unmedi-
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ated face-to-face focused interaction, all those involved can place everyone else
present in a 3D ‘frame’ as wide as the field of vision afforded by their eyesight.
And being relatively physically close to each other, they can hear more-or-less
what everyone else can hear. If there are bystanders, all participants will be
aware of them to a more-or-less equal extent (and the bystanders themselves
will have a view of all the participants). They inhabit the same world of the
senses. For those at opposite ends of a VL, on the other hand, the possibilities
for mutual monitoring are quite severely limited. Depth of vision is flattened
and of course the field of vision is only as wide as the screen, to such an extent
that in a multi-person encounter, a participant at one end of the VL may not
be able to see all the participants at the other end at the same time. And oppo-
site ends of the screen may be attended by different groups of bystanders,
participants at one end being perhaps totally unaware, and certainly not keenly
aware, of bystanders at the other.
These limitations cannot but affect behaviour. The presence of mediated
participants is inevitably felt less keenly than in a face-to-face encounter. Dur-
ing the encounter we have been examining, Soto, especially at first, bends
forward to speak, as if some special effort were required to ensure that her
words find their target, and indicating an awareness that she is addressing
someone whose range of hearing and vision is limited. It is no wonder that
her behaviour is influenced inordinately by the presence of the bystanders at
her end. It is reasonable to suppose that the behaviour of those at the court-
room end is likewise influenced. All the features contributing to the de-ratifica-
tion of Soto (section 5 above) must have been encouraged by the same sensory
limitations. Finally, we can see that these dislocated conditions may have facil-
itated the shifts and drift in footing and frame which made the trajectory of
the encounter so unfortunate. Would the judge have allowed himself that
“bye-bye” if the encounter had been unmediated. Would Soto have responded
“adios”? Perhaps not.
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